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Comparing social models: changing fads
Which social model is likely to be most competitive in
a globalized economy with free flows of goods, ser-
vices, capital and people across borders? That ques-
tion has been hotly debated for some time, and the
answers to it have varied a lot over the years. Indeed,
the perceptions of which social model is most suc-
cessful seems to be highly subject to fads and heavily
influenced by the most recent economic performance
of various countries. In my own country in the 1980s,
business leaders and policy makers were looking for
so-called blond Japanese managerial types to run our
businesses: if we could only foster entrepreneurs who
could import Japanese business practices to our
Scandinavian environment, and if our policy makers
could only imitate the apparently very sophisticated
and successful Japanese industrial policies, we should
be able to replicate the strong performance of the
Japanese economy – or so many people thought.
Then enthusiasm for Japan evaporated with the
bursting of the enormous Japanese real estate bubble
in 1989–1990 which has left the country in the quag-
mire of economic stagnation for more than two
decades now.
As the world gave up Japan as a role model for eco-
nomic development, the good economic perfor-
mance of the American economy during the 1990s
led many observers to argue that the US economic
and social model was highly fit for an era of inten-
sifying global economic competition. But after the
bursting of the dot.com stock market bubble in
2000 and the meltdown of the US financial system
in 2008, it has become somewhat harder to believe
in the strength of the laissez-faire oriented US
model.
In Europe there was a lot of focus on the booming
Dutch economy during the 1990s. Policy makers from
other countries were flocking to the Netherlands to
study the secrets of the so-called Dutch Miracle, hop-
ing to be able to reproduce the miracle at home. But at
the turn of the millennium the Dutch economy had
become strongly overheated, so the economy was
already starting to turn down when it was hit by the
global recession of 2001. The Dutch economy had to
struggle for several years to recover from this bust. 
In their never-ending quest for miracles, international
observers now turned their eyes on Ireland, a country
which for a long time had produced truly spectacular
rates of economic growth. Unfortunately the Irish
growth model ended up relying on a credit-driven real
estate bubble which was no less spectacular, and we all
know how the Irish story ended.
For a while during the last decade, Denmark also
enjoyed some popularity for our so-called flexicurity
model of the labour market. The flexicurity model
seemed to combine a low level of unemployment with
a high degree of equality and social protection. But
regrettably, we Danes repeated the mistake of the
Dutch and allowed our economy to overheat in the
run-up to the financial crisis, and so we were more
vulnerable when the crisis struck. With the sluggish
performance of the Danish economy in the aftermath
of the crisis, we are no longer so interesting to foreign
observers.
Instead, the revitalization of the German economy
has created a renewed interest in the German eco-
nomic and social model, often referred to as the social
market economy. The rehabilitation of Germany as
an economic role model is remarkable, considering
that the German economy was widely believed to be
quite weak only a few years ago.
The point of these observations is that international
perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of differ-
ent social models appear to be highly dependent on
the ups and downs of the business cycle. For a long
time, the structural weaknesses and underlying imbal-
ances in an economy can be hidden by an economicboom, but they suddenly stand out clearly when the
business cycle takes a serious downturn. In retrospect
it always seems easy to see the flaws of an economic
and social model that has suffered a set-back, but
diagnosing its vulnerabilities ahead of time is usually
a lot more difficult. Think of the recent financial cri-
sis: by now we economists have come up with a lot of
good explanations why it occurred, but very few of us
saw the crisis coming. This should make us humble
when we try to identify the most competitive social
models.
What do we mean by a ‘competitive’ social model?
Why are scholars, policy makers and journalists so
keen to study alternative social and economic mod-
els? Obviously because they hope to learn some eco-
nomic and social engineering that can be used to
improve their own societies. However, a trivial
though very important point is that policies and
social structures that seem to work well in one coun-
try are often very difficult if not impossible to repli-
cate in other countries. National economic and
social policies are developed in a local context con-
ditioned by the country’s historical and cultural tra-
ditions and specific deep-rooted institutions.
Moreover, policies are often complementary: the
success of a specific policy may depend on whether
other supporting policies are in place.
But although one country’s successful policies are
often difficult to transplant to other countries, it is
still interesting to discuss which economic and social
policies are likely to be most competitive in today’s
globalized economy. For this purpose I must explain
what I mean by the ‘competitiveness’ of a social
model. An individual business manager might say
that a national economic and social environment is
‘competitive’ if it allows his or her business to survive
and grow in the global market place, provided he or
she is no less competent than the average manager of
competing foreign firms. From a broader social per-
spective it is less obvious how one should define and
measure the competitiveness of a social model. Any
definition will be somewhat subjective, since it
involves ideas about the good society about which
opinions are bound to differ.
Nevertheless, I would argue that a country’s econom-
ic and social model is ‘competitive’ if it allows its citi-
zens to share the benefits from globalization in an
equitable manner. There are several aspects to this
definition. First, there are net benefits to be shared:
globalization is not a zero-sum game. This may seem
trivial to this audience, but the public debate often
leaves the impression that if some countries benefit
from globalization, others are bound to lose. This is of
course wrong: globalization allows all countries to
benefit from trade and specialization.
Second, my definition of competitiveness acknowl-
edges that while a country as a whole will gain from
participation in the international division of labour,
globalization certainly has the potential to create
losers as well as winners within the country. After all,
international trade and capital flows often induce
changes in the relative prices of goods, capital and
labour, and these relative price changes imply a redis-
tribution of market incomes. The Portuguese con-
sumers of textiles imported from China or India will
benefit from cheaper goods, but the competition from
abroad may mean that Portuguese textile workers
must either take a real wage cut or face unemploy-
ment. The challenge for policy makers is to carry out
economic and social policies ensuring that all citizens
receive a fair share of the gains from globalization. In
my example, this may mean that the government
should help the Portuguese textile workers to upgrade
their skills and/or help them find employment in other
sectors. More generally, a competitive social model is
one that avoids the counterproductive social conflict
and low social mobility that often comes with a high-
ly unequal distribution of income.
A third requirement implicit in my definition is that a
competitive social model should enable the country’s
average living standard to grow at a rate that is at least
comparable to the trend growth rate of other coun-
tries at a similar level of development. I realize that
this requirement may be challenged by raising the
philosophical question whether economic growth in
rich countries actually makes their citizens happier.
However, just as people tend to become frustrated if
they see their income lag behind that of their fellow
citizens within the country, they also tend to become
dissatisfied if they see their living standard fall relative
to that of citizens in similar countries with whom it is
natural to compare themselves. Hence it does not
seem unreasonable to say that a country has a com-
petitiveness problem if it experiences a subnormal
economic growth rate for an extended period.
Are the economic and social models found in Europe
‘competitive’ in the sense I have described? In dis-
cussing this issue, it may be useful to take a brief look
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at the Chinese and American social models since com-
petition from these countries is often seen as a threat
to the European welfare states.
The Chinese model
Any attempt to characterize the Chinese social
model is inherently problematic since today’s
Chinese society is a vast and complex organism 
displaying many contradictions and paradoxes.
Although the strategic industries are controlled by
the allegedly Communist state, many parts of the
Chinese economy look like a ruthless version of
19th-century Klondyke capitalism.
Arthur Kroeber (2008) has argued that China’s
bureaucratic culture is what distinguishes the country
from much of the rest of the developing world.
According to Kroeber, China’s ‘bureaucratic authori-
tarianism’ builds on a long historical tradition of gov-
erning the country through a loyal and relatively com-
petent civil service. Despite the many stories about
corruption, Kroeber argues that China’s economic
success stems to a large degree from the country’s
skillful bureaucracy.
China has been good at combining an abundance of
cheap labour with Western technology to mass pro-
duce manufactures for the world market. It follows
from what I have already said about the benefits of
international trade that Europe and other parts of the
advanced world should welcome the entrance of
countries like China and India in the global economy.
Adapting to the new patterns of world trade may
require some restructuring of the European economy,
but European consumers undoubtedly benefit from
the cheap goods imported from Asia.
Yet there is at least one aspect of the Chinese eco-
nomic model which may be problematic for the rest of
the world. China saves an abnormally high share of its
national income, leading to a massive capital export
that is reflected in large current account deficits in
many other countries, the United States being the
prime example. If the Chinese surplus capital were
systematically channeled into high-yielding produc-
tive investment in other countries, it would be all to
the good. But unfortunately historical and recent
experience shows that large and persistent current
account deficits often lead to the accumulation of
unsustainable piles of private and public debt which
end up triggering a financial crisis and/or a sovereign
debt crisis. Of course, it takes two to tango, so the
Chinese are not the only ones to blame for the current
account imbalances which rose to unsustainable levels
in the run-up to the recent financial crisis and which
are now building up again. Irresponsible macro poli-
cies and regulatory failures in the advanced
economies are the other side of this problematic coin.
Still, if we are to reduce the global imbalances that
threaten the future stability of the world economy, the
big Chinese savings surplus must come down.
The high household savings rate in China seems to
have deep historical and cultural roots, but in part it
may also reflect the absence of a well-developed pub-
lic social safety network. Despite its allegedly com-
munist foundations, the Chinese government has not
managed to establish welfare programs securing suf-
ficient public support for the elderly, the sick, the
disabled and the unemployed. Hence Chinese house-
holds must undertake large precautionary savings
for a rainy day. Establishing such public welfare pro-
grams would not only seem to be in the interest of
the ordinary Chinese citizen; it would also help to
bring down the large Chinese savings surplus, there-
by contributing to a much needed rebalancing of the
world economy.
In summary, copying the Chinese economic and
social model or just parts of it seems neither possi-
ble nor desirable. On the contrary, China and the
rest of the world would probably benefit if the
Chinese imported some of the European welfare
state practices.
The US model
Before turning to Europe, let me also offer a few
remarks on the laissez-faire oriented American eco-
nomic and social model. As I mentioned, many
observers saw the dynamism of the US economy
during the 1990s as proof of the superiority of the
American model. Subsequent events have exposed
some less flattering aspects of the US economic sys-
tem. The American model is now in trouble, strug-
gling to recover from a devastating financial crisis
and with a sovereign debt crisis looming in the hori-
zon. Yet history shows that one should not underes-
timate America’s ability to reinvent itself. The
strength of the US economy is its capacity to inno-
vate, and perhaps that capacity will serve as a basis
for a new era of prosperity once the current debt
problems have been overcome.However, as I see it, a major weakness of the
American economic and social system is its inability
to halt the long-lasting trend towards greater inequal-
ity in the distribution of income and wealth. Former
IMF chief economist Raghuram Rajan (2010) argues
that the irresponsible loosening of credit conditions in
the run-up to the financial crisis was due in large part
to pressure from politicians who were looking for a
quick and easy fix to the problem of stagnating or
falling real incomes for the poorer segments of the US
population. Rajan points out that the US educational
system has failed to upgrade the skills of a large part
of the American work force to the requirements of an
advanced knowledge-based economy. Hence many
American workers face falling real wages and poor
employment opportunities. For them the American
Dream is increasingly unlikely to ever come true. Yet
politicians insisted that even people who could not
afford it should be granted credit to buy their own
home. We all know how this subprime story ended.
Of course there were many other forces at work in
the build-up to the crisis, but Rajan’s story reminds
us that large and growing inequalities may threaten
the stability of an economic and social model. Rajan
believes that the US government needs to spend
more money on improving its educational system
and on active labour market policies to reverse the
trend towards growing inequality. Other observers
argue that the American government should spend
more on infrastructure investment and on environ-
mental protection. All of this will require more pub-
lic revenue, just as it is hard to see how America can
solve its public debt problem without raising addi-
tional tax revenue. From an outsider’s perspective,
this should not be difficult. The US tax level is rela-
tively low by international standards, and if the
country were to return to the far from punitive level
of income taxation prevailing during the Clinton
era, a large part of the fiscal gap would be closed.
Further, the United States is the only OECD country
that does not have a value added tax; it does not have
a carbon tax and its gasoline tax is way below any
reasonable estimate of the external cost associated
with fossil fuel consumption.
Yet the current majority of the US Congress seems
determined to avoid any kind of tax increase, even if
it takes the form of closing obvious loopholes in the
tax code. But let us not be too pessimistic. As Winston
Churchill once said, you can always rely on the
Americans doing the right thing, once they have
exhausted all other possibilities.
European welfare state models
The US economic and social model is sometimes held
out as an example of the so-called residual model of
the welfare state. In its pure version, a residual welfare
state is characterized by a relatively small public sec-
tor, a limited degree of redistribution of income via
the public budget and welfare programs which are sys-
tematically means-tested and targeted towards low-
income groups.
The continental European welfare states come in dif-
ferent varieties, but scholars often group them into
two broad categories, although no individual country
falls squarely into any of these two categories. One
category is referred to as the ‘universal’ model because
it offers various social security transfers and key
social services such as education, health care, child
care and care for the elderly to all resident citizens
regardless of their labour market status. This model
involves a large public sector and a high degree of
redistribution financed by general tax revenues. It is
based on the philosophy that people in social need
should be supported by the public sector regardless of
the ability of their families to support them. The
Nordic countries are usually seen as coming close to
this way of organizing a welfare state.
Another archetypical European social model is the
Bismarckian or labour-market based welfare state. In
this system you earn your right to social security ben-
efits by participating in the labour market. Hence ben-
efits are tied to social security contributions, and
needy individuals with little or no attachment to the
labour market are supposed to be supported by their
families. Families are also given a key role in the pro-
duction and financing of child care and care for the
elderly. Since social security benefits may well be high,
the public sector is not necessarily small in a labour-
market based welfare state, if you include social secu-
rity contributions in your measure of public revenue,
but the degree of income redistribution is less than in
a universal welfare state. Germany is often quoted as
an example of a Bismarckian welfare state.
In practice countries do of course mix elements from
the various theoretical welfare state models. For
example, in Germany needy citizens are entitled to
some amount of unemployment benefit and social
assistance benefit even if the benefits are not matched
by prior contributions. As another example, although
the Danish pension system offers a universal flat pub-
lic retirement benefit on a pay-as-you go basis, an
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important second pillar of the system consists of the
occupational fully funded pension schemes based on
contributions from employers and employees. In this
way the Danish pension system combines elements of
the universal and the labour-market based model of
the welfare state.
Some years ago when the ongoing process of global-
ization caught the attention of social scientists, it
was quite common to argue that the growing inter-
national mobility of capital and labour would grad-
ually force the European welfare states in the direc-
tion of the residual Anglo-Saxon welfare state
model. The idea was that countries with a high level
of taxation and redistribution would induce capital
and high-income earners to flee the country while
attracting low-income earners relying on public
transfers. In this way the public finances would be
systematically eroded, ultimately forbidding an
ambitious welfare state policy.
There was also a widespread belief that a welfare state
of the Bismarckian type would be more robust to
globalization than the universal welfare state because
the Bismarckian model involves less redistribution.
Yet the experience of recent decades is that the Nordic
countries have performed relatively well in economic
terms and that globalization has not forced them to
dismantle the key elements of their welfare states. In
the final part of this talk I will offer a few observa-
tions on the likely reasons for the relatively good per-
formance of the Nordic model.
The Nordic model: strengths and vulnerabilities
How is it possible for the Nordic countries to main-
tain such high levels of taxation and redistribution
without seriously undermining the economic incen-
tives to work, save and invest? One simple reason is
that the Nordic governments have managed to keep
the bases for their income and consumption taxes
quite broad by international standards. This helps to
keep marginal tax rates down. Moreover, the Nordic
so-called dual income tax combines progressive tax-
ation of labour income with a low flat tax rate on
capital income, thereby reducing the incentive for
capital flight.
The expenditure side of the Nordic welfare state bud-
gets also helps to broaden the tax base by encourag-
ing female labour force participation. Given the gen-
erous public provision of day care and care for the
elderly and the sick, women have been freed from
many of their traditional duties in the home and have
found more time to participate in the formal labour
market where the income they create are part of the
tax base. To a large extent the production of public
welfare services involves paying women to carry out
the same kind of work which they previously per-
formed for free at home.
Some critics have argued that the high rates of
employment in the Nordic countries simply reflect an
overexpansion of the public sector. According to this
view the Nordic countries have managed to keep
unemployment low only by offering an increasing
number of low-productive public sector jobs to pick
up the growing slack in the private demand for low-
skilled labour. This is the so-called ‘Scandinavian
trick’: instead of paying out unemployment benefits,
the Nordic governments offer the unemployed a pub-
lic sector salary along with a desk from which they
can carry out their low-productive work.
I do not deny that you can find examples of low-pro-
ductive public sector activity in Scandinavia, as else-
where. But I don’t think the theory of the
Scandinavian trick provides the main explanation why
the Scandinavian countries have managed to keep
unemployment relatively low even among the
unskilled. The fact is that public sector employees in
the Nordic countries tend to be relatively well educat-
ed. In Denmark, with which I am most familiar, the
average public sector worker has a higher level of edu-
cation than the average private sector worker.
I rather like to think that the relatively low unemploy-
ment rates in Scandinavia are to a large extent a pay-
off from the Scandinavian labour market policies. The
Danish so-called flexicurity model is often mentioned
in this context. The flexicurity model combines liber-
al rules for hiring and firing with relatively generous
unemployment benefits and an active labour market
policy. The active labour market policy in turn com-
bines generous public spending on adult education
and training with tough demands on recipients of
unemployment benefits to search actively for work
even if that involves crossing geographical or occupa-
tional boundaries.
The flexicurity model is often portrayed as an implic-
it social contract between employers, employees and
the state. Employers benefit from the liberal hiring
and firing rules. Employees and their trade union rep-
resentatives accept a low degree of formal job protec-tion because the state offers a decent level of unem-
ployment compensation and helps people to qualify
for a new job by offering additional education and
training, if necessary.
This description paints a rather harmonious picture
of the flexicurity model. I do believe there is some
truth in this vision. However, Danish economic
research suggests that government training programs
for the unemployed are not in themselves very effec-
tive in getting the unemployed back to work. On the
other hand, a lot of research indicates that the tough
demands on the unemployed to either find a job or to
enroll in an active labour market program provides a
strong incentive for many people to find work before
they are recruited for some program activity in which
they are not interested. In other words, the strict
requirement that the unemployed be active in one way
or the other seems to be an important reason for the
success of the flexicurity model.
The flexicurity model does seem to facilitate realloca-
tion of labour towards more productive uses. At least
it is a fact that the rate of labour turnover in the
Danish labour market is high, and the incidence of
long-term unemployment is low by international stan-
dards. More generally, it appears that the extensive
social safety nets and the active labour market policies
of the Nordic countries have helped to ensure popu-
lar acceptance of the economic restructuring that
comes with globalization. The Nordic countries have
a long tradition of supporting free trade and have
been good at adapting to the recent changes in the
international division of labour. 
However, the Nordic welfare state is based on a high
level of taxation and extensive public intervention in
many important aspects of life. The broad acceptance
of this social model may be due to the fact that the
Nordic countries have small and homogeneous popu-
lations. Historically these countries have therefore
been able to foster a degree of solidarity and trust
among citizens which may be difficult to replicate in
larger and more diverse societies.
The Nordics do not have any historical experience
with immigration on a significant scale, and that may
be one reason why populist political parties with an
anti-immigration platform have recently gained
ground in the Nordic countries. But apart from the
cultural aspects, there is also an economic challenge
here: a large fraction of recent immigrants to
Scandinavia come from backgrounds with no tradi-
tion of female labour force participation and with low
education levels that are hard to square with the high
wages paid for low-skilled labour in Scandinavia.
Hence these groups are hard to integrate into the
Nordic labour markets. The problem is that maintain-
ing a high employment rate is key to the fiscal viabili-
ty of the Nordic social model.
More broadly, increasing international factor mobili-
ty does pose significant challenges to the universal
model of the welfare state where all residents are enti-
tled to transfers and public services regardless of
whether they have contributed to public revenue or
not. Population ageing will also put growing pressure
on the Nordic public finances, and dealing with this
challenge in countries where the level of taxation is
already very high will not be easy. Yet I take comfort
in the fact that the Nordic countries have so far been
quite good at implementing politically difficult eco-
nomic and social reforms without throwing the wel-
fare state baby out with the bathwater.
References
Kroeber, A. (2008), “Rising China and the Liberal West”, China
Economic Quarterly, March 2008, 29–44.
Rajan, R.G. (2010), Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten
the World Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
PANEL
The Chief Economics Commentator of The Times,
Anatole Kaletsky chaired the first panel and began
by describing how capitalism has evolved historical-
ly in response to new situations. As a reaction to the
current crisis, a new model of capitalism may emerge
with a new system of checks and balances between
the market and the state where each exerts a disci-
plining force on the other. Europe, in his opinion, is
well placed to lead the thinking for this new form of
capitalism. 
The first panel statement came from the Bavarian
Finance Minister, Georg Fahrenschon, who outlined
the basic principles of the social market economy.
(1) Fair competition: supply and demand should be
determined by prices and markets, not by govern-
ment intervention. This encourages companies to
improve their competitiveness. (2) Social equilibri-
um: a social market economy combines economic
efficiency with social responsibility. It was
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Germany’s social safety net that helped it cushion
the effects of the last crisis. Still, too much redistrib-
ution is detrimental to economic incentives. This
right balance must be found. (3) Subsidiarity: the
focus is on the individual; the state sets the ground
rules, pursuing an ‘active and activating economic
policy’. In the last crisis, economic stimulus and sta-
bilisation programmes were necessary, but they
“must not mutate into permanent measures”.
(4) Self-responsibility: everyone must bear responsi-
bility for their own action. Risk and responsibility
are inseparable, for individual as well as for institu-
tions. (5) Subsidiarity: ‘long-term development
instead of short-term success, enduring values
instead of quick profits’ should be the guiding prin-
ciple of all businesses. One reason Germany quickly
overcame the crisis was the sustainable practices of
its many small and medium-sized businesses. These
principles of the social market economy can be
adopted by other countries and adapted to their in  -
dividual requirements.
Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator of the
Financial Times, stressed that the differences among
the various economic models – Anglo-Saxon, Social
Market, Nordic, Southern European or Asian –
should not be exaggerated. The UK economy, for
example, conforms less to the Anglo-Saxon model;
it is much more like continental Europe, ‘in all the
bad ways’. In terms of the share of public spending
in GDP, Britain is very solidly in the European
pack, the United States is approaching the
Europeans and France is ahead of most Nordic
countries. In terms of borrowing, however, the
Anglo-Saxon countries are far in the lead, which
does, on the other hand, contribute to the
dynamism of German export markets. There is also
no real difference among the models with regard to
long-term performance. Also when looking at what
happened in the crisis, “GDP and unemployment
performance in the crisis is not model-specific”. In
terms of GDP, the US economy was the most
resilient in the crisis and Britain performed miser-
ably. In terms of unemployment, it doubled in the
United States and productivity soared. “Britain had
a very modest unemployment increase despite a
GDP catastrophe”, which implies that it has a very
continental labour market. “The United States is
out there on its own with a properly functioning
labour market”, and it may benefit from this in the
long run. All this calls into question the existence of
an Anglo-Saxon economic model.
Michael Hüther, Director of the Cologne Institute for
Economic Research, listed some of the factors that
helped the German labour market overcome the crisis
so successfully: the moderate wage policies in the late
1990s, the recent labour market reforms, and the
short-time working subsidisation scheme, all of which
helped stabilise employment in Germany and put
firms in a position to step up production quickly. He
went on to comment that despite the converging
trends brought about by globalisation and system
competition, “key areas of economic activity … fol-
low very strong national patterns and structures”.
However, a country’s institutional arrangements are
only sustainable if they are sufficiently flexible and
responsive. 
Neo Boon Siong, Nanyang Business School in Singa  -
pore, provided the Asian perspective on the panel
topic. His government has always regarded economic
growth as the key to solving social problems. After
stagnant growth during the crisis, Singapore has
returned to high-level growth, largely due to its flexi-
ble response to changes in the world economy. Given
its small size, the country is dependent on its human
capital. It is highly connected to the rest of the world
and has created a business-friendly environment. The
financial reserves it had built up helped it overcome
the crisis. During the crisis, labour was subsidised for
the first time and unemployment did not exceed 4 per-
cent. The government also guaranteed a portion of
bank loans in the crisis without intervening in banks’
market decisions. Finally, Singapore’s social safety net
is constructed in such a way that the work ethic is not
eroded. 
In the discussion, Elmar Brok, Member of the Euro  -
pean Parliament, pointed out that important deci-
sions need to be made at the European level in three
areas: (1) stricter control of national budgets, (2) a
more effective stability programme and (3) improving
the competitiveness of the EU countries. 
Barbara Judge, Chairwoman of the UK Atomic
Energy Authority, raised the question of the extent to
which the female labour participation rates are a suc-
cess factor of the Nordic economies, especially in the
light of shrinking work forces. Anders Borg agreed
that this is a factor and stressed the structural reforms
in Sweden that have given women incentives to enter
the labour market: eliminating family taxation,
almost cost-free child care, an autonomous pension
system that encourages working and a cost-effective
health-care system. Hans-Werner Sinn wondered whether Sweden’s suc-
cess was because it turned away from the
Scandinavian model, and also why the government
sector is so large in the Nordic countries. Is this not
a form of hidden unemployment? Anders Borg
argued that Sweden has not abandoned the model
but has reformed it, keeping its core values: high
labour market participation rates, limited income
inequality, gender equality and openness. The
reforms have placed an emphasis on welfare services,
which are more efficient than economic transfers.
Peter Birch Sørensen addressed the problem of the
‘Scandinavian trick’ of a large public sector to main-
tain a high level of employment. Many public sector
employees are women working in the area of social
services, performing tasks that were once unpaid.
Theoretically, this work could be privatised and
receive a government subsidy, thus reducing public-
sector and increasing private-sector employment.
The effect would be the same.
Michael Fabricius, Managing Director of Fabricius
Vermögensverwaltung GmbH, expressed the concern
that self-reliance is being weakened in Europe and
that too much responsibility is being transferred to
the state. He asked how Sweden managed to get the
balance right between government responsibility and
leaving room for entrepreneurship. Anders Borg
replied that Sweden’s competitiveness is ranked fairly
high although the country is weak in entrepreneur-
ship. His government has tried to improve the situa-
tion of ownership by lowering taxation. “Ownership
is one of the key links to entrepreneurship” and it is a
mistake to tax it too much. 
Neo Boon Siong cautioned that competiveness should
not be looked at in terms of Europe alone to the
neglect of the dynamism of the market economy that
is developing in Asia. Since the private sector behaves
globally, it is necessary to view the competiveness of
European companies and countries in the light of the
global environment.
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